State Regulation of Open-Access, Common-Pool Resources. by Gary D. Libecap
































Gary D. Libecap 
 
Karl Eller Center and Department of Economics 
University of Arizona 
and  








Open-access, common-pool resources, such as many fisheries, aquifers, oil pools, and 
the atmosphere, often require some type of regulation of private access and use to avoid 
wasteful exploitation.  This paper summarizes the arguments and literature associated 
with this problem. The historical and contemporary record of open-access resources is 
not a happy one, and many of the problems persist, despite large aggregate gains from 
resolving them. The discussion here suggests why that is the case. The paper focuses on 
government responses to the common pool, the private and political negotiations 
underlying them, and the information and transaction costs that influence the design of 
property rights and regulatory policies.  Understanding the type of institution that 
emerges and its effects on the commons depends upon identifying the key parties 
involved, their objectives, and their political influence.  Further, it requires detailed 
analysis of the bargaining that occurs within and across groups.  The paper summarizes 
the open-access problem and provides case analyses of regulation of common-pool 
fisheries, oil reservoirs, and the atmosphere. The final section summarizes the general 
themes and the advantages of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach to 
analyzing the common pool.  
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“But still another inquiry remains; one often agitated by the more recondite 
Nantucketers.  Whether, owning to the almost omniscient look-outs at the mast-heads of 
the whaleships, now penetrating even Behring’s straits, and into the remotest secret 
drawers and lockers of the world; and the thousand harpoons and lances darted along all 
continental coasts, and so remorseless a havoc; whether he must at last be exterminated 
from the waters, and the last whale, like the last man, smoke his last pipe and then 





Open-access, common-pool resources, such as many fisheries, aquifers, oil 
pools, and the atmosphere, often require some type of regulation of private access and 
use to avoid wasteful exploitation.
2  In the absence of constraints on users, such as those 
provided by informal community norms, more formal property rights, or other types of 
state regulation, individuals competitively exploit the resource rapidly and wastefully. 
Short-term horizons dominate, with little investment or trade to channel the resource 
across time or across users to higher-valued applications.  This excessive extraction, 
which amounts to private plunder, continues so long as it is in the interests of the 
individual parties, even if society would be better off with less intensive and extensive 
use.  Without some limits on individual behavior to better reflect broader, social 
benefits and costs, only private net benefit calculations govern resource use decisions.   
The historical and contemporary record of open-access resources is not a happy 
one.  The depletion of valuable fisheries, the overdrawing of critical aquifers, the 
stranding of rich oil deposits following excessive, competitive extraction, and the 
dumping of smoke and other pollutants into the air are examples of the common pool.  
Unfortunately, many of these open-access problems persist, and the discussion here 
suggests why that is the case. Throughout this chapter, the terms common pool, 
commons, and open access are used interchangeably.  They do not refer to common 
property, which is a type of solution to the open-access, common pool, as described 
below.   
Despite the documented losses of the commons, it is not always in society’s 
interest to completely confront the problem.  Too many resources may be required, 
                                                           
1 I am grateful to Jim Smith who brought this passage to my attention.  In this chapter, I cite selections 
from the literature on regulation of the common pool.  The literature is a large one, and the list referenced 
here is only suggestive, not exclusive. 
2 Prepared for The Handbook of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Menard and Mary 
Shirley. I benefited from comments and suggestions provided by the editor and referees, Joe Bial, Ryan 
Johnson, Dean Lueck, Steve Salant, and Jim Smith.  The International Center for Economic Research 
(ICER) Turin, Italy provided research support.  
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relative to the benefits achieved.  In some cases, for example, where very large 
geographic scales or  highly mobile resources are encountered, the transaction costs of 
defining and enforcing even loose constraints can be prohibitive, at least compared to 
the value of the resource at stake. In other cases, where there are large numbers of 
heterogeneous parties competing for the asset, the transaction costs of reaching 
agreement among the competitors on access and use restrictions also can be very high, 
relative to the anticipated gains.  Or, in a third case, information may be so limited or 
controversial regarding the benefits of controlling entry and use that no consensus is 
achieved on the need to take action.  Such information problems arise from high 
transaction costs of collecting and conveying data regarding the status of the resource 
being exploited. In all of these situations, the “commons” persists because of transaction 
costs.  It is too costly to place boundaries around the resource; it is too costly to secure 
agreement to limit individual actions; and it is too costly to obtain enough information 
to determine the proper course of action to protect the resource.  In these cases of high 
transaction costs, continuation of the commons is efficient, as Coase (1960, 39) has 
taught us. 
By contrast, in other situations where information is clearer about the costs of 
the common pool and where monitoring entry and agreeing on acceptable uses can take 
place with relatively lower transaction costs, then community rules can reduce open-
access losses. Indeed, if a common resource is accessed locally by a comparatively 
small number of parties with similar or generally homogeneous objectives and 
production costs, then the problem of overuse often can be effectively addressed 
through informal rules or norms that constrain individual actions. Under these 
circumstances it can be relatively easier for a small group of similar people who have a 
history of interaction with one another to gather and interpret information about the 
resource’s status and to agree upon the types of uses and constraints necessary to 
conserve it.  They also can accept the distribution of the costs and benefits (and 
ultimately, of wealth and political power) within the community that is inherent in any 
definition and assignment of use privileges, even under informal arrangements. 
Community management of regional agricultural irrigation water, pastures, or inshore 
fisheries provides examples of successful mitigation of the losses of the commons.   
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These solutions to open access are termed, “common property.”
3   
When transaction costs rise due to larger numbers of heterogeneous competitors, 
perhaps attracted by exogenous forces, such as price increases or technological changes, 
that raise the value of the asset or that lower the costs of entry, then local, informal 
arrangements, such as community norms may no longer be effective in combating the 
wastes of open access.  The demands of new entrants who have not been part of the 
previous arrangement now have to be addressed.  The previous allocation of costs and 
benefits of resource use must be reassigned among a larger group of claimants.  Old 
claimants receive less as more of the resource is diverted to the new parties.  It will be 
difficult for both parties to agree to the required new division. They have had either 
limited or no past interaction and share no common, verifiable information about the 
state of the resource.  They are unlikely to have common norms regarding resource use 
or income and cost distribution, and they likely have very different time constraints that 
govern harvest practices.  All of these factors, together with the shear increase in the 
number of competing parties, raise the transaction costs of agreeing to and abiding by 
informal community rules (Olson, 1965).   
When community rules break down, more formal state intervention may be 
required, if open-access losses are to be avoided.
4 The coercive power of the state 
transcends or at least mediates the claims of any one group.  Through the political 
process summarized below the state can define and enforce new access and use 
arrangements and provide more formal mechanisms for arbitrating disputes. Indeed, 
there are a variety of possibilities for state involvement to reduce the wastes of the 
common pool.  
One response is the assignment and enforcement of more definite property rights 
to the resource, whereby only owners are granted access. If completely defined, a 
system of private property rights equates private incentives with social benefits and 
costs.  The owner becomes the residual claimant of the resulting benefits and costs from 
                                                           
3 Ostrom (1990) provides a theory and empirical evidence regarding successful local collective action to 
address common-pool resource (CPR) problems.  Experiments and more field studies are included in 
Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994).  Other case studies and conceptual arguments are in the readings 
included in McCay and Acheson (1987); Ellickson (1991); Hess (1996); Burger, Ostrom, Norgaard, 
Policansky, and Goldstein (2001); and Ostrom, Dietz, Dolsak, Stern, Stonich, and Weber (2002). Useful 
summaries of the uses of NIE in examining commons problems are found in the readings included in 
Acheson (1994).  
4 For discussion of the development of property rights in the Amazon frontier, see Alston, Libecap, and 
Schneider (1996); Alston, Libecap, and Mueller (1999, 2000).  Deacon (1999) examines the relationship 
between deforestation of the common forest and property rights arrangements.  
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resource use decisions.  Property owners have the right to sell or otherwise exchange the 
asset or to pass it along to their heirs.   
Under these circumstances, socially-optimal resource use decisions result, even 
though the actions are made by private parties. Reliance on private property rights 
reduces the role of state regulation to one of enforcing ownership, arbitrating disputes, 
and refining rights through the judiciary or legislative process as relative prices or 
technologies change.
5  
Another response to the common pool is state ownership, whereby the state 
retains formal property rights and controls individual access and use through a variety 
of entry and production restrictions.  Under state ownership, resource use decisions will 
be made by government officials, either politicians or bureaucrats, who technically are 
not residual claimants.  They are not “owners,” but authorized agents or managers.  
Because they are not to be guided by private pecuniary objectives in their decisions, 
production, investment, and exchange decisions involving state-owned assets are 
determined by political factors as described below.  Under these circumstances, there 
may or may not be a close blending of private and social considerations when the agents 
make resource use decisions. Accordingly, distortions may result, but they may be 
socially acceptable if private rights either are not possible or are not politically feasible 
for reasons to be examined shortly. 
A third response to the problem of open access is a hybrid of private ownership 
and state regulation, whereby individuals hold property rights, but the range of resource 
options is heavily constrained by regulatory restrictions and taxes.  The regulations 
define how much of the resource can be extracted at any point in time, when it can be 
accessed, the types of investment that can be made, and the nature of allowable 
exchange.  Receipts from sales are taxed to reduce private returns from harvesting or 
otherwise using the resource in order to better preserve the stock. A related hybrid 
arrangement retains government ownership but delegates use privileges to private 
parties.  Again, the private use privileges are sharply limited by regulation and fees to 
close the margins through which resource rents would otherwise be dissipated.   
The type of state response selected depends upon a number of factors.  One is 
the physical nature of the resource and whether private property rights to it can be 
assigned and monitored at reasonable cost. As noted earlier, broadly-spread resources, 
                                                           
5 See the development of property rights and the limited role of the state as enforcer in Anderson and Hill 
(1975); Libecap (1978, 1989); and Barzel (1989).  
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such as the atmosphere, or mobile resources, such as ocean fisheries, are examples 
where private property rights may not be feasible. The higher the cost of assigning and 
enforcing private property rights, the more likely is reliance upon government 
ownership and regulation of private use.  Indeed, some ubiquitous resources often are 
viewed by the population as “common” or public resources precisely because restricted 
access historically had not been possible. Distributional objections can impede 
government actions to limit access and use of what had been viewed as a “public” 
resource.  Sustained resistance to the charging of fees to public beaches or parklands to 
ration use is an example of this problem.   
Another factor affecting the nature of state response to open-access losses is 
resource value.  More valuable resources attract greater competition for control and 
potentially, greater rental losses as the parties compete to appropriate the asset.  Under 
these circumstances, government ownership and regulation of private access and use is 
unlikely to be as effective in maximizing resource values as is a system of private 
property rights.  Private property rights better align incentives for effective resource use 
because, as noted earlier, “owners” are residual claimants, unless there are critical 
externalities involved.  By contrast, under state ownership there is no clear residual 
claimant.   
If there are important third-party effects associated with private ownership and 
use, however, private property rights may not be socially-optimal, even when resource 
values are high.  It is often asserted, for example, that very special or unique national 
assets with high amenity values be retained and managed under public ownership.   
National parks for the management of important natural regions or phenomena are an 
example.   
A third, and related factor that influences the nature of the state response to the 
commons is equity.  Equity issues dominate politics and political action. The 
assignment of more precise private property rights to avoid rent dissipation implicitly 
involves an assignment of wealth and political power.  Exclusion is required if property 
rights are to have any meaning, and exclusion means that some parties will not be able 
to use or earn a living from a resource that previously been available to them.  This 
situation may raise equity concerns, especially if the new rights arrangement 
importantly changes status quo  economic and political rankings.
6 
                                                           
6 Demsetz (1967) notes the role of social norms in influencing the type of property system selected.   
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The new rights assignment may lead to a more skewed wealth distribution than 
has previously been acceptable. Politicians may respond to these equity concerns by 
adopting tax schemes to reduce the wealth gains of rights holders.  Although such 
actions might address equity concerns, they can have efficiency consequences, allowing 
some of the losses of the commons to continue. For example, taxation reduces the 
expected private returns from otherwise desirable long-term investment, and as a result, 
it is neglected.   
This chapter focuses on government responses to the common pool, the private 
and political negotiations underlying them, and the information and transaction costs 
that influence the design of property rights and regulatory policies.  Understanding the 
type of institution that emerges and its effects on the commons depends upon 
identifying the key parties involved, their objectives, and their political influence.
7  
Further, it requires detailed analysis of the bargaining that occurs within and across 
groups. The analytical problem is compounded if the common resource crosses political 
boundaries or if citizens of multiple jurisdictions or nations are involved.  In these cases, 
intergovernmental regulations are required, so that political bargaining within and 
across jurisdictions must be examined as well. 
Among the transaction costs involved in addressing the commons, information 
problems play an especially important role. There may be limited or controversial data 
regarding the magnitude of the open-access problem.  If this is the case, it will be 
difficult for the parties to predict how they will be affected by any institutional change 
to address the commons.  If there is no consensus on the size of waste or risk to the 
stock associated with the commons, then it will be even more difficult to agree to a 
distribution of the rewards and costs as part of any proposed regulation or property 
rights arrangement. Disagreements over the seriousness of the losses of the common 
pool increase if the problem cannot be readily observed and verified by generally-
available information.  Similarly, disputes are likely if the scientific or engineering 
evidence on the problem is obscure, inconclusive, or asymmetrically held.  Since these 
conflicts increase the transaction costs of taking action, they delay responses to open-
access situations. 
Resolving information disputes not only requires additional data, but agreement 
on their interpretation and implications for the distribution of the aggregate benefits and  
                                                           
7 For analysis of bureaucratic incentives, see Johnson and Libecap (1994).  
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costs of controlling the commons.  Reaching agreement on all fronts may not be easy if 
the data remain controversial and if the negotiating parties are very different in how 
they access and react to the data. How these bargaining or negotiation problems are 
resolved and the time that it takes to do so, influences the nature of the institutions 
adopted, when they are implemented, and their ultimate impact on common-pool 
externalities.  
Disputes over solutions to the commons are not merely academic.  Successful 
policies require that some parties be denied access and that others have their use 
practices significantly constrained.  This may curtail access and use that has spanned 
generations with important distributional consequences. The more severe the open-
access problem, the greater the needed restrictions on individual behavior.  More and 
more parties must be expelled or have their access sharply constrained and regulated.  
Current income from resource use for many parties will fall dramatically.  Others who 
are granted property rights or regulated, controlled-access, may find their wealth 
position sharply improved. As a result, the costs and benefits of resolving the commons 
are unlikely to be uniformly spread.   
Some parties see themselves made worse off from institutional change, absent 
compensation, even in the face of potentially large aggregate gains.  Others see clear 
improvements, unless their gains are taxed away.  Accordingly, the seriousness of the 
problem, the nature of the solution, the identities of who gains and loses, the 
compensation to be paid, and its form are the issues that dominate both private and 
political debate over state regulation of the common pool.  Even though intervention 
might reduce losses in the aggregate, politics determines the nature of the outcome, the 
distribution of the benefits and costs, and the resulting institutional response may bear 
little resemblance to what an ideal solution might be.  
With its attention to the transaction costs associated with the bargaining that 
must take place among heterogeneous parties, private, politicians, bureaucrats, and 
judges, all of whom will act with limited and/or asymmetric information, the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) provides a useful way of analyzing state regulation of the 
common pool.
8  The NIE helps explain why regulation is often delayed, takes different 
forms across jurisdictions and countries, and why the suggested approach using a strict, 
neo-classical framework, which routinely abstracts from transaction costs, most likely 
                                                           
8 For summaries of the approaches of the NIE, see Williamson (1975, 1979), Eggertsson (1990), Furubotn 
and Richter (1997).  Allen (1991) discusses transaction costs.  
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will not be the observed solution to open access.
9  Consideration of transaction costs 
helps to make clear why property rights or regulation take the forms that they do.  As 
such, the NIE makes possible a better understanding of actual human behavior, 
institutions, and resource outcomes.  
Section II briefly reviews the common-pool problem, and Section III describes 
some of the transaction costs associated with assigning more complete property rights or 
devising alternative regulatory solutions. Sections IV through VI examine common-pool 
fisheries, oil reservoirs, and the atmosphere. The final section summarizes the general 
themes and the advantages of the NIE approach. 
 
II.  The Common Pool. 
H. Scott Gordon (1954), Anthony Scott (1955) and Steven N.S. Cheung (1970) 
describe the problem of the commons in their classic articles.
10 Using open-access 
fisheries to define the issue, Gordon discusses the motivation and effects of infinite 
entry by homogeneous fishers, operating under the rule of capture.  According to 
Gordon, entry occurs so long as the private marginal costs of access and harvest are less 
than or equal to the average returns for all fishers.  Continued entry and the associated 
fishing pressure eventually dissipate all economic rent. He identifies the institutional 
conditions underlying this dismal outcome (Gordon, 1954, 124):  “There appears then, 
to be some truth in the conservative dictum that everybody's property is nobody's 
property.  Wealth that is free for all is valued by no one because he who is foolhardy 
enough to wait for its proper time of use will only find that it has been taken by 
another...The fish in the sea are valueless to the fisherman, because there is no assurance 
that they will be there for him tomorrow if they are left behind today.”   
As noted in the Introduction, open-access conditions usually arise when the costs 
of defining and enforcing restrictive boundaries are high relative to potential benefits.  
Hence, low-valued resources that are migratory or otherwise difficult to delineate often 
exist as a common pool. Other resources may lie within the commons due to cultural, 
                                                           
9 Similarly, see North’s (1990) observation that property rights institutions that promote efficient resource 
use are the exception rather than the norm. 
10 The wastes of the common pool also are outlined in Libecap (1998a). Heller (1998) and Buchanan and 
Yoon (2000) describe the counter problem of under utilization of a resource when the right to exclude is 
held by multiple parties.  Brooks, Murray, Salant, and Weise (1999) model common property extraction 
using two approaches.  Bial (1998) examines interstate arrangements in the Ohio River valley to control 
water pollution prior to federal intervention.  Early discussion of open access and private roads is in Frank 
Knight’s classic article on social costs (1924).   
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legal, or political precedents that mandate free and open access, at least to particular 
parties.  In either case, individuals who use the resource do not bear the full social costs 
of their actions, and because of this, they exploit it too intensively and do not invest in 
the long term. The benefits of individual actions are narrowly focused, but the costs are 
spread among all parties. With the resulting relentless pressure to extract the commons, 
total output or use exceeds the social wealth-maximization point, where total social 
costs and benefits are equated. The rush to produce and accompanying ownership 
uncertainty leads to waste as competing claimants divert labor and capital inputs to 
predation and defense.
11 Violence is characteristic, particularly if external factors lead to 
a rise in resource values or lower access and use costs.   
For example, Alston, Libecap, and Mueller (2000) describe violent conflict over 
land in the Brazilian Amazon frontier.  As access roads are provided, lowering 
transportation costs, competition for open agricultural land increases, and land values 
rise.  Yet, property rights on the frontier are unclear and enforcement of claims 
uncertain.  Accordingly, infringement of holdings and occupancy of land claimed by 
others results in disputes, sometimes with deadly outcomes.   
The problem of the commons also is outlined by Garrett Hardin in his 1968 
Science  article, “The Tragedy of the Commons.” In discussing incentives among 
competitive herders to overgraze a common pasture, he concludes (1968, 1244): 
“Therein is the tragedy.  Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase 
his herd without limit—in a world that is limited.  Ruin is the destination toward which 
all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest…” Johnson and Libecap (1980) 
describe the empirical case of Navajo herders in the American southwest that illustrates 
the problem raised by Hardin.  Since rights to rangeland are not formally defined or 
enforced on the Navajo Reservation, each herder is motivated to have his sheep occupy 
and graze the land completely.  Individual control of a particular part of the range is 
respected only so long as the sheep occupy the land.  If they are withdrawn, other 
herders move their animals onto the range. Any grass that is left by one herder for the 
future by reducing harvest, only invites entry from neighboring herders.  The incentives 
to overgraze open-access pastures are clear, and over time the land gradually erodes and 
loses its productive capacity.   
                                                           
11 Bohn and Deacon (2000) argue that insecure ownership can reduce investment and use of natural 
resources when capital costs for extraction are relative high.  This result counters the usual case of higher 
extraction rates when rights are poorly defined.  
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Hardin’s solution (1968, 1247) to the tragedy of the commons is coercive 
regulation of individual behavior—“mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” to escape 
the “horror of the commons.” And he notes, but does not develop, the critical problem 
of regulating the commons--distributional outcomes that are not acceptable to key 
parties.  He asserts, however, that “injustice is preferable to total ruin.” But total ruin is 
not so obvious to all parties in many common-pool settings.  As mentioned above, the 
parties often disagree with the timing and appropriate form of intervention, and they 
object to the allocation of the costs and benefits associated with addressing the 
commons.  These concerns raise the transaction costs of reaching agreement on the 
commons problem, affecting both the timing and nature of the action taken.   
 
III.   Regulation of Open Access. 
The losses of the common pool often seem so apparent that difficulties in 
devising effective regulation come as a surprise.  In fact, unfortunately, by the time the 
wastes associated with open access become very visible, much of the damage already 
has been done.
12 Avoiding these losses motivates collective action to define more 
exclusive property rights or to assemble regulatory policies for controlling access and 
use. Historical and contemporary experiences with large commons problems, however, 
reveal that the process of institutional change is neither very smooth nor complete.
13 
Indeed, state intervention typically occurs late in resource use and depletion, when there 
is finally a political consensus among the parties regarding the extent of the common-
pool losses and the distribution of the benefits and costs of taking action.   
This pattern of late responses is repeated in the examples provided below for 
fisheries and oil. Without considering the costs of gathering, interpreting, and conveying 
information about the resource stock as well as the costs of negotiating among the 
relevant parties for institutional change, it is not possible to understand the timing and 
form of state intervention.  
The larger the expected aggregate gains from controlling open access, the more 
likely some institutional change in the form of regulation and/or the assignment of 
property rights will take place. As Garrett Hardin (1968, 1248) argues, the commons 
can be tolerated so long as the magnitudes of the waste are low, but as they rise, the 
                                                           
12 See the summary in Brown (2000) regarding the timing of management efforts. 
13 Libecap (1989); North (1990).  
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social benefits of resolving it increase. Still as noted, broad agreement on the wastes of 
open access and the means to resolve it may take considerable time.
14 
A general consensus that common-pool losses are large is not always sufficient 
to bring about a successful institutional response due to conflicts over the distribution of 
benefits and costs among the various constituencies involved.  These include competing 
private parties, politicians, and regulators, and in the design of regulation each attempts 
to maximize their private net gains.  Lobby groups are formed to advance the objectives 
of particular groups, and interest groups in turn, negotiate to build larger coalitions in 
favor of desired arrangements. When state action is required, politicians are lobbied to 
implement the proposed regulation or property rights. Logrolling exchanges and other 
compromises are necessary within the political arena in order to devise a solution that 
has sufficient support to be enacted.  Each of these layers of negotiation involves 
different transaction costs that mold the institutions that eventually result.
15  
Negotiations within and across groups of resource users are more difficult the 
greater the number and heterogeneity of the parties involved. With larger numbers, 
more claims to the resource must be resolved and more must be excluded (Olson, 1965). 
With greater heterogeneity in terms of objectives, production costs, and access to 
information, it is more difficult to reach a policy consensus, and to enforce agreement. 
This is a standard outcome in cartels and other collective action settings (Schmalensee, 
1987), and it plagues negotiations over institutional change and the common pool. 
Parties who anticipate that new regulation or assignment of property rights will 
make them worse off relative to the status quo will see few benefits from the new 
regime and will attempt to block it, unless compensation is forthcoming.
16 Conversely, 
proponent constituencies anticipating improved access to the resource will, along with 
their political representatives and administrative agencies, seek either enhanced 
regulatory authority or preferential property rights. 
Information and measurement problems, however, raise uncertainty about the 
actual nature and distribution of the benefits and costs of regulating the commons.  For 
instance, a resource’s response to reduced harvest pressure may be understood very 
imperfectly. This is a common problem, for example, in fisheries where fishing pressure 
is only one of many factors influencing the health of the stock.  Similarly, good 
                                                           
14 For examples in the case of oil fields and global warming, see Wiggins and Libecap (1985), and Bial, 
Houser, and Libecap (2002). 
15 Libecap (1989, 10-28). 
16 Johnson and Libecap (1982); Lueck (1995).  
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information about the precarious nature of the resource often is held asymmetrically by 
advocates, but their claims are viewed with skepticism by opponents who view the 
claims as self-serving.  In cases, such as the oil example provided below, the status of 
the resource cannot not be conveyed credibly by proponents because data interpretation 
typically is ad hoc and not easily replicated.  Some parties, as we will see below, take 
advantage of these information and measurement problems to opportunistically advance 
their own interests that are only tangentially related to the commons problem.
17 With 
limited data it can be very costly for using parties to sort through the claims that are 
made regarding the need for regulation.  
As noted above, measurement costs are lower for observable, stationary 
resources, and conversely are higher for larger, mobile, unobservable resources.   
Compliance must be verified in order to maintain an effective coalition for reducing the 
losses of the commons.  The aggregate benefits of any institutional response to open 
access, as well as individual shares of those benefits, depend upon general adherence.  
Otherwise, harvest pressure will be not reduced and the commons not addressed.   
Cheating by some reduces incentives of all parties to adhere to the arrangement.  
Within political negotiations to address the common pool, side payments in the 
form of preferential regulation, subsidies, or property rights to the resource often are 
proposed to mitigate opposition from those who otherwise expect to be harmed by any 
new constraint on general access.  As illustrated below, this practice occurred when 
small oil producers in Texas in the 1940s and 1950s were offered beneficial production 
quotas within a proposed regulatory framework to control output. Small producers had 
opposed regulation because they had taken advantage of open-access conditions to drain 
their larger neighbors.  Larger producers, however, were willing to agree to these 
preferential quotas as a means to secure political support for regulation.  
When side payments like these are offered to mitigate potential losses from 
restricting the commons, there must be agreement on which parties will be affected; the 
magnitude of the harms involved; whether compensation is warranted; and its size, 
source, and form. Measurement problems raise the costs of assessing competing claims 
in negotiations over transfer payments. Compensation requires some agreement on the 
value of current and proposed uses of the open-access resource so that an acceptable 
level of taxation can be determined to fund the transfers. Valuation is controversial if  
                                                           
17 Williamson (1975, 1979) discusses opportunism.  
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there are information asymmetries among the parties, which impedes consensus on the 
value of resource use with or without regulation. Further, there may be political 
opposition to the form of compensation to be paid.  Cash transfers typically involve the 
fewest economic distortions because real resources are not involved, but if the political 
visibility of cash payments makes them unacceptable, less efficient alternatives must be 
devised.   This situation, for example, explains why small oil producers in Texas 
received preferential production quotas, even though they led to wasteful extra drilling 
and output.  The alternative of cash payments to certain producers to retire their 
production was too transparent to be politically acceptable and too difficult to calculate 
effectively. The granting of special production quotas, in contrast, was simpler and less 
obvious to general taxpayers.   
Compensating side payments to broaden support for regulation or a change in 
property rights may not be possible for some key parties.  They may not have legal 
standing for such transfers and measurement of claims may be very difficult.  One 
important group affected are politicians, who might lose constituents if the closing of 
the commons dramatically reduces the population of communities that previously had 
exploited the open resource. Another group is regulatory officials whose mandates are 
reduced if a system of private property rights replaces a regulated commons.  A third 
group are those parties who supply inputs or otherwise provide services to those who 
use the commons.  Successful regulation of open access resources, however, reduces 
their customers by lowering both production and the number of accessing parties. 
Absent compensation, these groups can be expected to strongly oppose institutional 
change, and politicians, especially, may be in an excellent position to block or mold any 
response to the commons. 
Finally, precedents affect the range of feasible options for addressing the 
common pool. A legacy of past informal or formal property rights can give some parties 
a vested interest in the commons.  They will oppose institutional changes, even ones 
that promise aggregate benefits, unless they can be made better off under the proposed 
arrangement.  It may not be possible, however, to improve their welfare and still 
maintain the advantages of the institutional change, especially if they must be denied 
access to the resource and full compensation is not provided.  Groups with vested 
interests may have advantages in political bargaining relative to other groups through 
lower costs of collective action.  Their current position in the system binds them 
together to make them a relatively cohesive bargaining group.  They also have  
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beneficial ties to established political processes and leaders.  These advantages make 
vested interests effective political lobbyists, biasing institutional change toward 
maintenance of the commons and limiting successful resolution of common-property 
problems.  This situation is illustrated in the examples that follow, and it suggested that 
institutional change generally will involve only incremental adjustments from open 
access. 
These information and bargaining issues complicate accord on political side 
payments to draw in recalcitrant parties and they raise the transaction costs of reaching 
agreement on new property rights arrangements or regulations to reduce the losses of 
open access. By contrast, if transaction costs were zero or very low, then action could be 
taken quickly.  Indeed, if transaction costs were zero, there would be no open-access 
problem to begin with.  It would be possible to costlessly devise restrictions on access 
and use (Coase, 1960).  But in practice, transaction costs are high, allowing commons 




III.  Regulation of a Classic Common-Pool Resource: Wild Ocean Fisheries. 
Wild ocean fisheries are characterized by open access and competing fishers 
who have no ownership in the stock. Except for relatively stationary inshore shellfish 
fisheries, private property rights to fish stocks are not feasible due to high definition and 
enforcement costs.  Rights to migratory species that cover wide expanses of the ocean 
also require coordination across multiple political jurisdictions.  Inshore species that 
remain within more limited spaces, such as in a bay or restricted coastal region, can 
have more clearly defined ownership institutions.  Examples include private leases for 
oyster beds and territorial rights in U.S. coastal lobster fisheries. In Japan, fishers’ 
associations manage local inshore stocks.
19 In some cases, however, even where 
potentially feasible, private ownership of fish stocks have met with opposition by those 
who object to such broad grants of property rights to wild species.
20 In the 1950s the 
U.S. Department of Justice rejected, as violations of the Sherman Act, attempts by 
                                                           
18 Yoram Barzel (1989) emphasizes transaction costs and measurement problems in implementing 
property rights regimes 
19 For territorial rules and their enforcement in U.S. oyster beds, see Agnello and Donnelley (1975). For 
the U.S. Northeast lobster fishery, see Acheson (1975, 1988) who provides details on the institutions that 
lobster fishers have developed. Berkes (1986) describes local management of inshore fisheries in Turkey.  
For Japan, see, Asada, Hirasawa, and Nagasaki (1983) and Yamamoto (1995).  
20 See discussion by Lund (1980) and Lueck (1989, 1991).  
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fishery unions to control access to inshore bay fisheries.
21 The result of these actions, 
which were prompted by excluded fishers, was to return the fishery to a common pool.  
Historically, addressing commons problems in fisheries has started with denying 
some groups access to a fishery.  Usually these arrangements involve giving preference 
to well-defined political constituencies, such as a country’s citizens relative to non 
citizens, sports relative to commercial fishers, inshore relative to offshore fishers, or 
large boat owners relative to small boat owners.  This approach temporarily, at least, 
reduces entry and total fishing pressure while avoiding politically-controversial 
distributional issues in regulating the catch of those allowed to remain.
22 Limited-access 
controls without accompanying harvest restrictions, however, increase individual 
returns and eventually, encourage new entry and rent depletion by group members.   
When this occurs, other regulations must be added, such as reductions in the allowable 
number of fishing days, as well as boat size and gear restrictions that raise fishing costs.  
Monitoring and enforcement problems reduce the effectiveness of these controls, and 
fishers compete on unregulated dimensions, dissipating the economic value of the 
fishery.  The underlying problem is that the regulatory structure does not make fishers 
residual claimants in the stock.  
One effort aimed at forestalling the depletion of large, coastal fisheries was the 
adoption of 200-mile exclusive economic zones, beginning in 1976 by the U.S and other 
countries.
23 The exclusive zones at least meant that foreign fishers could be denied 
access, thereby reducing harvest pressure. Domestic fishers, however, increased their 
intensity in response. In the U.S., for instance, a frenzy of investment in new boats and 
equipment soon replaced the excluded foreign fishers.  Fisheries outside the 200-mile 
limit remained under open-access, and international efforts have had no power to 
exclude and no jurisdiction for enforcement. Within the 200-mile zones, attempts at 
regulation to maintain fish stocks have mostly been unsuccessful due to opportunistic 
maneuvering by fishers, processors, regulators, and politicians representing depressed 
                                                           
21 See discussion of court cases in Johnson and Libecap (1982). 
22 For example, Higgs (1982) describes the rise of sport fishers as an effective interest group in lobbying 
for regulations that constrained commercial fishers in the Pacific Northwest salmon fishery. Similarly, in 
the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery analyzed by Johnson and Libecap (1982) inshore, bay shrimpers and 
offshore Gulf shrimpers competed to place differential constraints on one another, rather than to find 
more comprehensive management arrangements.  General fishery regulation problems are described in 
Johnson and Libecap (1982); Karpoff (1987); Wilen (1985, 1988, 2002); Anderson and Leal (1993); 
Homans and Wilen (1997); De Alessi (1998); Arnason, Hannesson, and Schrank (2000); and Hannesson 
(2002). 
23 The Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 authorized 200-mile exclusive economic zones.  For 
discussion see Hollick and Cooper (1997, 148-9) and Sebenius (1984).  
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fishing communities. In addition, the effects of harvest cannot always be convincingly 
separated from natural factors, such as fluctuations in ocean currents and temperature, 
and as a result, fishers have not accepted arguments for stricter rules.  
In cases where agreement can be reached on the condition of the stock and 
appropriate total allowable catch (TAC), it must be divided among eligible fishers. 
Here, however, there are critical distributional effects with important political 
ramifications.  The tighter the limits, the more fishers who must exit and the greater the 
political outcry, especially from politicians from fishing communities where there are 
few alternative economic opportunities.  Additionally, Johnson and Libecap’s (1982) 
examination of fishery regulation points out how restrictions can have differential 
impacts on fishers who vary according to ability, capital equipment, and size. In 
particular, very productive fishers, who have adapted well to the common pool, will be 
harmed if regulations involve the assignment of politically-popular uniform catch 
quotas.
24 Uniform catch quotas are popular among many fishers, politicians, and 
regulators because they are comparatively easy to define, at least compared to quotas 
that vary across fishers; they do not require the information necessary to verify past 
catch, which is often the alternative basis for assigning quotas; and they do not 
explicitly provide differential rights and wealth assignments to what had previously 
been an open or “common” resource.  For all of these reasons, uniform catch quotas 
involve lower transaction costs of definition and assignment.  But they obviously can 
make better fishers who had been successful under open access, worse off under the 
new regulatory regime.   
Accordingly, with differential histories of productivity among fishers, some may 
have a stake in maintaining the commons and resisting regulations that could 
redistribute income. When the fishery is virtually depleted these distributional concerns 
can become less important, allowing for agreement on tighter controls. Many fishers 
have left the fishery, and those that remain are more homogeneous with regard to 
expected future prospects and are more likely to see themselves made better off from 
new arrangements. Under such conditions, regulation is more likely to be adopted and 
to be more successful, but by this time, the stock may be critically damaged. 
                                                           
24 Uniform rules are popular with regulators because the ease of design and enforcement, and they are 
attractive to politicians because they do not appear to grant preferential privileges to the fishery.  
Similarly, Lueck (1995) has argued that very productive parties within a common-pool setting may seek 
to maintain status quo first-possession rules, even though broad social costs might be involved.  
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In the meantime, regulations that do not explicitly redistribute income, such as 
fixed fishing seasons, can be adopted without much controversy.  These general 
regulations, however, allow fishers to compete in other ways, usually through increased 
capitalization--larger boats with more costly search and harvest gear.  These 
investments increase catch and deplete the stock, forcing even shorter seasons, which in 
turn, lead to a new round of wasteful competitive capitalization. 
The Pacific Northwest halibut fishery is an example.  A limited entry regime 
was put into place in 1979 in British Columbia with the maximum number of vessel 
licenses set at 435, gear restrictions, total allowable catch within the fishing season, and 
minimum fish size rules. A fishing derby ensued as fishers competed by adding vessels, 
crews, and times spent fishing. The number of vessels rose quickly from 333 in 1980 to 
the limit of 435 by 1988, when total harvest peaked at 12,859,562 pounds, up 128 
percent from 1980.  The halibut stock declined, forcing regulators to reduce the 
allowable season to ensure the TAC was not exceeded. By 1990 the season had shrunk 
to 6 days from 65 days in 1980. With a very short fishing season, the catch had to be 
stored frozen for the rest of the year, denying consumers higher-valued fresh fish.
25 This 
unsatisfactory situation led to a new regulatory approach, the introduction of Individual 
Transferable Quotas (ITQs) in British Columbia in 1991 and in Alaska in 1995. 
Through quota exchanges, gradually the number of vessels declined, the stock 
rebounded, and the season was extended, reaching 245 days by 1993.
26  
Under a ITQ regime, a total allowable catch is determined by the regulatory 
authority, based on evaluation of the stock and ocean conditions and then divided 
among fishers as harvest quotas.
27 These quotas are valuable use rights that are 
exchanged among fishers and gradually accumulated by those who are most productive 
and have lowest fishing costs.  In this manner, fishing effort is adjusted to maximize 
returns. Although there are enforcement problems and incentives to discard less 
                                                           
25 Gaudet, Moreaux, and Salant (2002) argue that the ability to privately store a common-pool resource 
can accelerate extraction and increase waste.  Further, if there are both common-pool and privately-
owned resources, the race to extract and store can shift the of exploitation to the common resource. 
26 Discussion of regulation of the Halibut fishery is provided in Grafton, Squires, and Fox (2000); Wilen 
and Homans (1998); and Wilen (2002). 
27 Even so, ITQs do not grant property rights to the stock.  Such rights could allow for the adding of 
fertilizer to increase the growth of plankton and other food sources for fish.  For additional discussion of 
ITQs, see Johnson, (1995) and the readings included in Arnason and Gissurarson (1999).  The readings 
included in the two volumes edited by Shotton (1999) provide a very complete discussion of property 
rights issues and regulation in fisheries, including why ITQs are often resisted, despite their many 
beneficial attributes.  The volumes also include histories of management efforts across a variety of 
fisheries and countries.   
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valuable fish under ITQs, they represent a more effective method of regulating the 
fishery commons.  
Nevertheless, ITQs are controversial.  The issue hinges on who will get them 
and the wealth they represent. There must be some limits on the quotas in order for 
them to have value and for the fishery to be protected.  One method is to assign quotas 
to those who have a history of fishing in the industry, but this arrangement 
disadvantages potential new entrants, and they mobilize in opposition.
28  U n i f o r m  
allocations harm “highliners,” those captains who consistently outperform other fishers.  
There are other objections to granting certain fishers ownership windfalls to a common 
resource. Windfall-profit taxes and the distribution of quotas through auctions would 
allow the state to capture more fishery rents, but are naturally opposed by fishers.  ITQs 
were adopted in New Zealand in 1986, and in 1991 in Iceland, two nations that depend 
critically on their fisheries and conservation of the stock. In other countries, ITQs have 
had more limited experiences.  Political opposition in the U.S. resulted in them being 
placed on hold in 1996.  In Norway ITQs have been resisted by regulatory officials, 
politicians from small fishing villages, and some processors. Even where they have been 
adopted, small fishing boats have been exempted.
29  
As a result of the slow and fitful movement of regulation, most wild ocean fish 
stocks are at precariously low levels due to heavy fishing pressure. Myers and Worm 
(2003) estimate that that the large predatory fish biomass in the world’s oceans is only 
about 10 percent of pre-industrial levels. These include some of the most commercially 
valuable species.  Hence, despite a large and (in some cases) old literature in economics 
and biology on fishery management and equally large and expensive fishery 
management regimes, many of the world’s leading fisheries remain under some variant 
of open access.  The high costs of controlling entry; the information problems 
associated with determining fish stocks and the usefulness of various regulatory 
policies; the equity concerns raised in denying entry to some fishers; and the related 
transaction costs of forming and implementing effective property rights and regulatory 
programs help explain why the record of closing the commons in major fisheries is such 
a disappointing one.  
 
                                                           
28 See Lueck (1995) for discussion of the right of first possession. 
29 For discussion of the political economy of Icelandic regulation, see Gissurarson (2000); for New 
Zealand, see Clark, Major, and Mollett (1989) and Sharp (2002); and for Norway, see Hannesson (1985). 
Regulation in these and other fisheries also is discussed in the readings included in Shotton (1999).  
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IV. Regulation of a Common Resource: Oil.  
As with wild ocean fisheries, subsurface oil and gas reservoirs can be a 
common-pool resource. The condition arises when multiple parties competitively 
extract hydrocarbons from a subsurface reservoir.  Under the rule of capture, ownership 
of the oil is obtained only upon extraction.  In the U.S. the problem occurs because 
ownership of the mineral rights to a single reservoir often is fragmented, with many 
firms seeking the same migratory oil.  The problem also occurs to a lesser degree in 
places like the North Sea and Caspian Sea where reservoirs are partitioned by 
international boundaries with separate production concessions within each partition.
30 
Because fragmentation is less severe in the North Sea, competitive extraction is less of a 
problem, but it still occurs along concession boundary lines.   
In either case, producing firms have incentives to maximize the economic value 
of their holdings, rather than that of the reservoir as a whole.  They competitively drill 
and drain, including the oil of their neighbors to increase their private returns, even 
though these actions reduce the overall value of the reservoir.  Capital costs are driven 
up with excessive investment in wells, pipelines, and surface storage, and production 
costs rise with too-rapid extraction.  This practice leads to the premature venting of 
natural gas or other fluids that help drive the oil to the surface. Total oil recovery is 
reduced. As in fisheries, the commons problem in oil production has been recognized 
for a very long time, and the property rights/regulatory responses have been similarly 
complex and controversial.  
The number of firms involved in competing for oil provides a sense of the scope 
of the problem. On the Yates, Hendrick, and Seminole fields of Texas and Oklahoma, 
all discovered in the 1920s, there were respectively, 16, 18, and 40 different firms with 
extraction leases, and on the huge East Texas field discovered in 1932, over 1,000 firms 
were pumping its oil by 1933.
31 A possible solution was early consolidation of 
production rights, at least in domestic U.S. oil fields. Empirically, however, buy-outs to 
internalize externalities were not the solution to the common pool.  The early or 
‘gusher’ stage of field development with its fury of production and waste, was the time 
of least information about the value of individual holdings, limiting the possibilities for 
exchange.
32 The conflicting strategic bargaining positions of so many independent 
                                                           
30 Libecap (1998, 643).   
31 Libecap and Wiggins (1984, 89-94). 
32 Some of the problems of asymmetric information in valuing leases are addressed in Wiggins and 
Libecap (1985).  
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agents, compounded by the problem of holdouts, posed insurmountable difficulties in 
consolidating production leases or in privately coordinating production programs.  
As a result in the U.S., state regulations were implemented in the 1930s to limit 
the drilling of wells, control their spacing, and constrain the extraction of oil and gas 
through assignment of production quotas. These regulations were supported by some 
producers, resisted by others, and the policies that emerged were molded by political 
factors. The compromises necessary to build a political consensus for regulation 
ultimately weakened its ability to address the common-pool externality, although it was 
still an improvement over open access. In Texas, the Railroad Commission set monthly 
statewide production levels and allocated the total among regulated wells. The 
production rules were applied uniformly to all fields, even though each oil field had a 
unique physical configuration and optimum production potential.  This approach raised 
production costs relative to what might have occurred with alternative regulatory 
designs.  Further, as noted earlier the numerous and politically-influential owners of 
high-cost wells were exempted from production controls altogether.
33Small, high-cost 
producers (often called “independents”) were located in almost every Texas county and 
they had close ties to local politicians. Further, they were serviced by local oil-field 
supply firms and they hired local labor.  These firms were comparatively homogeneous 
and effectively organized for political action as the Texas Independent Producers 
Organization (TIPRO).  Larger producers (the so-called, “majors”) often were 
headquartered out-of-state and hence, viewed as “foreign.” Moreover, they were located 
on the largest, most productive fields, which were in fewer parts of the state.  They 
often had internal oil-field supply support and brought in their own labor.  For all of 
these reasons, despite their wealth and size, the major oil firms were less politically 
effective in designing oil production regulation in Texas than were the independents.  
Unitization, which placed the management of the reservoir under a single firm, 
while granting other producers shares in the net revenues, became an increasingly 
popular alternative response to the common pool by the 1940s.
34 Although it offered an 
effective remedy to production externalities, its progress was limited. The key issue was 
conflict over a share formula to divide the net proceeds of unit production among the 
various parties.  Agreements often were not forthcoming until late in a reservoir’s 
productive life, when enough common information had emerged about the nature and 
                                                           
33 See Libecap and Smith (forthcoming).  
34 For more on unitization, see James L. Smith (1987); Libecap (1998b); Libecap and Smith (1999, 2001).  
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value of both the reservoir and individual leases.  If unit contracts were to succeed, they 
had to award each party a fixed share of production and costs, making them residual 
claimants to reservoir-wide rents. If such uniform shares could not be agreed to, then 
either no unit was formed or less effective contracts were concluded.  
In their analysis of unitization negotiations on seven fields in the United States, 
Wiggins and Libecap (1985, 377-83) found that on average it took six years for 
agreements to be reached. During the process, many parties became discouraged and 
dropped out of unitization efforts. The bargaining problem was so widespread that even 
as late as 1975 only 38 percent of Oklahoma and 20 percent of Texas production came 
from unitized fields.
35 Similarly, because the parties on the immense Prudhoe Bay field 
of Alaska could not reach agreement on the value of their respective leases so as to 
assign cost and revenue shares to a complete unit, the reservoir was partitioned in 1977 
into an “oil rim” and “gas cap.” Two unit operators were selected for each partition, and 
there were separate allocations of production costs and benefits among the parties in 
each partition, even though they covered the same reservoir.  Conflicting motivations 
for production developed, resulting in serious waste until 1999 when company mergers 
and consolidation of holdings finally (after 22 years) completely unitized the reservoir.
36 
In face of these problems, state governments adopted legislation to force 
unitization through majority rules. Compulsory unitization laws were adopted in most 
states, but in Texas political resistance by small firm owners blocked enactment. Small 
firm owners sought to protect the production advantages they held under existing 
regulation.
37Compulsory unitization laws facilitated the adoption of units, and where the 
problem was due to holdouts by those seeking a greater share of reservoir rents and the 
reservoir contained only oil, the effect was to improve welfare. But in cases where the 
reservoir contained both oil and natural gas, the impact of compulsory unitization was 
not so straightforward.
38 Because future relative oil and gas prices were uncertain, the 
respective owners often held disparate expectations about lease values, making it 
impossible to agree on the terms of trade necessary to assign overall unit shares.
39 When 
the coercive power of the state was used to force trades and unitization, the resisting  
                                                           
35 Libecap and Wiggins (1985, 702). 
36 Libecap and Smith (2003). 
37Libecap and Wiggins (1985). 
38 Such situations have been frequent since 63 percent of the largest U.S. oil fields have contained 
significant volumes of natural gas along with oil.  See Libecap and Smith (forthcoming). 
39 Libecap and Smith (2001).   
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parties could be made worse off because they were forced into an exchange that was no 
longer voluntary.  The terms of trade under these conditions is conceived by reluctant 
parties as offering less than what they require for full compensation for resource. Hence, 
what otherwise appeared to be an obvious government solution to a breakdown in 
private bargaining may not have improved welfare.  
 
V. State Regulation of the Common Pool: Air Pollution. 
Air pollution also is a common-pool resource problem. Because there 
historically has been no effective means of assigning property rights to the atmosphere 
to control private access and use, the air has been a convenient, low-cost medium for 
disposing of the byproducts of production.  The emissions from one plant are carried 
into the atmosphere, spreading the costs of pollution and diluting any negative effects 
on the polluter. In the same manner, however, the benefits of controlling emissions are 
distributed across multiple parties and regions, whereas the costs of regulation are 
directly born by the owners of the plant.  This setting creates collective action problems 
for combating polluting, while plant owners have incentives to resist or minimize the 
effects of regulation.  
If pollution is localized, then it may be possible for private negotiations to take 
place among those emitting the pollutants and those seeking cleaner air.
40 Similarly, 
where large industrial plants are involved, firms have incentive to recognize the effects 
of emissions on their workers and equipment because they internalize at least some of 
the pollution costs and because only one or two parties are involved in negotiating and 
implementing controls. Where pollution problems are more broadly spread, however, 
the transaction costs of private collective action are much higher. The number of parties 
involved is greater as are the incentives to free ride. Monitoring compliance is more 
difficult. The fundamental theorem regarding such transaction costs in dealing with 
externalities was developed by Ronald Coase. He made clear that consideration of the 
costs and benefits was essential and that in some cases “…it would cost too much to put 
the matter right” (Coase, 1960, 39).  
Some form of state regulation, then, may be the only reasonable means of 
controlling air pollution.
41 Traditionally, emission regulation has relied upon “cap-and-
                                                           
40 Similarly, see James Buchanan’s (1972) interpretation of the possibilities for private negotiation to 
resolve conflicts between owners of red cedar trees and owners of apple trees.   
41 Kolstad (1999, 135-54) outlines some of the major issues in environmental regulation.  
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control” rules issued from regulators regarding setting overall pollution targets, defining 
allowable discharges from particular sites, and requiring installation of scrubbing 
technology and filter equipment.  Much of the attention has been directed to electric 
utilities as major sources of pollution.  Since plants vary as to their age, technology 
used, and fuel source—natural gas, high-sulfur coal, low-sulfur coal--the costs of 
compliance vary sharply.  Accordingly, the way in which regulation is administered 
affects both the overall cost of achieving air quality standards and the competitive 
positions of utilities, their customers, and fuel suppliers.  There is opportunity for 
molding regulation to the advantage of the politically influential in ways that do not 
necessarily assist in meeting air quality objectives.   
For instance, the first significant federal air pollution legislation in the U.S. was 
the 1970 Clean Air Act. It established national maximum standards for ambient 
concentrations of SO2 and created new source performance standards (NSPS) for new or 
refurbished power plants and factories.  The NSPS required upgrades of pollution 
controls whenever plants were constructed or improved. Further, the 1977 Clean Air 
Act Amendments required that all new coal-powered plants adopt scrubbers even if they 
burned low-sulfur coal.  This rule weakened the competitive advantage of low-sulfur 
western coal and those utilities that used it relative to high-sulfur eastern coal. The “new 
source bias” of regulation raised the costs of shifting to new, less polluting plants and 
extended the economic lives of older, dirty plants that were not burdened by new 
control costs.  Although overall SO2 emissions declined after enactment of the 1970 
Clean Air Act, by 1990 over two-thirds of remaining discharges came from the less-
regulated older plants constructed before 1970.
42  This example, as in the case of oil 
regulation, demonstrates how bargaining positions and political influence mold the 
design of regulatory policies to address open access.  The resulting design may bear 
little resemblance to an idealized solution and may be comparatively less effective in 
reducing the wastes of the commons.  
Another example of political manipulation of the design of regulation to address 
the commons is the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) requirement of the 
Clean Air Act of 1970.  This provision of the law prohibited deterioration of air quality 
in any region where it exceeded national standards.
43 The PSD, inserted by 
                                                           
42 Joskow and Schmalensee (1998, 45) examine the complex political economy of air pollution 
regulation. 
43 Pashigian (1985).  
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congressional representatives from the Northeast, was designed to limit plant migration 
to the South and West, where industrial pollution was less severe and where regulation 
compliance would be less costly. The PSD, however, did not improve overall air quality 
since the closing of old, polluting plants in the Northeast and the construction of new 
cleaner ones elsewhere could have reduced pollution.
44 
The potential for political opportunism increases if policy evaluation requires 
scientific information that generally is not available to citizens. For example, extension 
of the ethanol subsidy of over $10 billion since 1979, in part, depends upon the 
manipulation of information by proponents, chief of which are representatives of 
Midwestern corn farmers. Although, ethanol is alleged to improve air quality, its effects 
are mixed. Adding ethanol to gasoline can reduce carbon monoxide emissions from 
automobiles, but it increases discharge of nitrogen oxide and other pollutants into the 
atmosphere.
45 Taxpayers have little easy access to the kind of information necessary to 
evaluate the claims of ethanol producers.  With the costs of the subsidy and the 
pollution broadly spread across the population and the benefits narrowly focused on a 
few constituencies, there has been no strong incentive for lobby groups to form to 
challenge ethanol with the relevant information.
46 
More effective regulatory tools are tradable pollution permits, which were first 
authorized by Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 to reduce S02 
emissions. Tradable permits are alternatives to centralized regulation of pollution 
sources. They are property rights to pollute, and because they can be exchanged, they 
allow for flexibility and efficiency in meeting pollution standards.  As such, they are 
similar to ITQs in fisheries and unit shares in oil and gas reservoirs in more effectively 
addressing common-pool problems.  Plant owners who can comply with regulation at 
lower cost sell their emission allowances to those who have higher compliance costs, 
allowing pollution to be reduced at lower total cost.   
Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey (1998) found that the emissions rights market 
in the U.S. had become reasonably efficient by 1994, lowering the costs of compliance 
                                                           
44 The PSD rule was the result of successful political action by representatives of northeastern states. On 
the other hand, Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) find mixed results for political lobbying. Representatives 
of polluting states, which had been successful in obtaining preferential rules under Phase I of the Clean 
Air Act Amendments, did not do as well with Phase II regulations. 
45 Johnson and Libecap (2001, 123). 
46 MTBE producers who were competitors for ethanol did have some incentive to challenge the claims 
made by ethanol producers.  MTBE, however, had problems of its own—contamination of ground water 
and has been banned in many areas.  
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with clean air rules.  Aggregate annual targeted SO2 emissions are prorated among 
plants, determining their individual emission allowances. If a plant is to discharge more 
than it is authorized and not face penalties, its owners must secure allowances from 
another plant that will pollute less than allowed.  Brokers also purchase unused 
allowances and are a source of tradable permits.
47 Accordingly through this process, 
permits are transferred from newer, “clean” plants to older, “dirty” ones where it would 
be very costly to meet SO2 caps. The success of emission permits in SO2 regulation has 
led to proposals to expand their use to regulate other air pollutants, such as nitrogen-
oxygen compounds and mercury nationally and CO2 internationally.  The rising value of 
clean air and associated controls on open access, the comparative ease in which 
emission permits have been defined and traded, and the fact that these exchanges have 
been generally between larger, more homogeneous firms, assisted by brokers, explain 
why “air rights” have emerged in these cases.  
Air pollution often crosses political boundaries, and thereby involves 
international negotiations. These raise special bargaining problems for developing 
effective state policies as illustrated by international efforts to control greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions in order to slow or reverse possible global warming.
48 There is a great 
deal of uncertainty about the magnitude of the overall global warming problem, how to 
address it, and the distribution of benefits and costs across countries and constituencies 
within them. The scientific information remains controversial, and there are concerns 
about treaty compliance by sovereign countries. Abatement by any country benefits 
others as a public good, but if abatement is costly to a country’s citizens, its politicians 
have incentive to invest less in reduction efforts than would be globally optimal.   
Moreover, representatives of developing countries have demanded concessions to 
reduce the costs of any treaty.  They base their demands on equity grounds, arguing that 
developed countries were the source of much of past GHG emissions and that 
developing countries should not be saddled with the costs of regulation.  These 
                                                           
47 There are also some allowances issued through EPA auctions. See Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey 
(1998) for details on the emission permit markets.  See also Joskow and Schmalensee (1998). A thorough 
discussion of the history and operation of U.S. acid rain regulation is provided in Ellerman et al, (2000). 
Hahn (1984) outlines some implications for market power resulting from how transferable rights are 
allocated. 
48 These include the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) signed at Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992 where countries pledged to voluntarily reduce carbon emissions to 1990 levels by 2000; a 
meeting in 1995 in Berlin of the Conference of Parties (COP), created at the Rio conference, to define a 
structure for further action; and the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming of December 1997 For analysis 
of the political bargaining issues involved, see Bial, Houser, and Libecap (2002).  Rose (2002) examines 
tradable environmental allowances that could be used in global warming regulation.  
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information problems, compliance issues, and differential demands made by 
representatives of both developed and developing countries have raised the transaction 
costs of designing comprehensive GHG regulation.  
Further, the expansive scope of the problem involves many constituencies, some 
that might be harmed by the imposition of taxes or other regulations to control 
emissions and others that might be benefited. Heterogeneous constituencies and the 
uncertainty confronting each party in calculating the net effects of the GHG regulation 
create political problems for country politicians in formulating bargaining positions in 
international negotiations.  These problems and the transaction costs noted above 
explain why GHG regulation has been so controversial and is unlikely to be effective 
for some time.  As more information is generated in the future regarding the seriousness 
of the problem and the distribution of the costs and benefits of regulation, agreement on 
global warming policies may be more likely, just as it has been in fisheries and in oil 
pools.  
 
VI. State Regulation of the Common Pool: Concluding Remarks. 
Theory and research regarding collective action to regulate common-pool 
problems comes when: a). there is broad consensus or agreement on the aggregate 
benefits to be gained,  b).the parties perceive positive net gains from agreement, and 
c).they are homogeneous with respect to bargaining objectives and in the distribution of 
the costs and benefits to be incurred.  Agreements reached under these conditions tend 
to be self-enforcing because it is in the interest of all parties to insure success.   
Collective action may also achieve its objectives if the parties are heterogeneous with 
respect to the net gains from cooperation if: a). the spread is not too great, b). there is 
little uncertainty as to the consequences of agreement, and c). there are bases for 
constructing side payments to compensate those parties that may bear more costs or 
receive fewer gains.  The side payments must be long term and predictable, and there 
must be enforcement arrangements.  When these conditions are not met, then 
responding to the commons will be less straightforward.  
In the cases examined in this chapter, the political processes of designing 
regulation and property rights have been complex, influenced by the positions of the 
bargaining parties involved and the transaction costs of reaching and enforcing 
agreements.  Even so, there is a gradual trend from centralized, “command-and-control” 
regulation to greater reliance on individual property rights.  In oil and gas, the focus is  
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on promoting unitization; in fisheries, ITQs; and in air quality regulation, tradable 
emission permits.  Property rights are more flexible, and they better link individual 
incentives with socially-efficient outcomes.
49 As a result, they can lower the costs of 
addressing the commons. This pattern is consistent with the predictions made by Harold 
Demsetz (1967) who argued that property rights would emerge gradually as it became 
cost-effective to do so. 
Understanding the process of regulatory change, the institutions that emerge, and 
the observed effects of regulation requires attention to bargaining among the affected 
parties and the transaction costs involved.  This approach is a hallmark of the NIE, and 
it provides valuable insights into the nature and results of state regulation of the 
common pool.  
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